

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

March 10, 2000

TO: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: D. F. Owen, D. J. Grover, RFETS Site Representatives
SUBJECT: RFETS Activity Report for the Week Ending March 10, 2000

Administrative Control Program Deficiencies. DOE-RFFO has conducted an assessment of Building 371 administrative control program deficiencies (see last week's site rep. report). Based on their findings, DOE-RFFO has requested that Kaiser-Hill perform an Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) determination to ascertain whether the multiple administrative control program deficiencies have impacted the building's safety basis. This week it was also determined that Buildings 371 and 559 have deficiencies with their organization and management programs. (3-A)

Fire Suppression Systems. An USQ regarding fire suppression systems has been identified for several of the RFETS nuclear facilities. It was determined that the water pressure in the facilities' fire suppression systems is insufficient to simultaneously supply water to the building sprinklers and fire hoses as well as the HEPA filter plenum deluge system. During the evaluation, it was identified that the issue would also apply if two separate fires occurred in a facility at the same time. Kaiser-Hill has curtailed operations in the facilities and is verifying combustible loadings. (3-A)

Work Planning and Control: As noted in the site rep. report of December 30, 1999, the Board staff had identified deficiencies in implementation of the RFETS Integrated Work Control Program (IWCP) and Kaiser-Hill was considering improvements to IWCP guidance and training to address the deficiencies. This week a revision to the IWCP manual was issued and is to be effective in a few weeks. Key among the changes are new requirements that the Job Hazard Analysis (JHA) is to be the main vehicle for identifying safety controls, to include incorporating controls from side hazard analysis efforts such as radiological and hot work permits. Managers and key work planning personnel will be required to verify that the JHA safety controls are properly implemented in the work procedures/instructions, etc. prior to conduct of work. The site reps. will monitor RFETS management emphasis on adhering to these changes as well as formal training on the IWCP manual revision. (1-C)

Inner Tent Chamber (ITC) Development. A site rep. observed a partial demonstration at a local vendor of the next generation ITC system (ITC Phase 2) to be used for glovebox size reduction. ITC Phase 2 has design features to reduce exposure to sources of contamination seen in ITC Phase 1 including a waste box integral with the inner chamber and hand/glove ports for access in lieu of sliding doors. The design incorporates remotely operated plasma-arc cutting tools. Also noteworthy are double-layer plexiglass panels allowing contaminated inner panels to be removed and disposed into the waste box while being replaced by the outer panels. System testing and operator training is to begin in April. Startup of ITC Phase 2 in Building 771 is projected for the summer 2000. (3.B)

cc: Board Members